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This report first clarifies the nature of human error and performance from a dynamic 
perspective, using two models, one relating to perception and another to situation awareness, 
as examples of that. The report also briefly describes the dynamic nature of the operating 
environment of the nuclear power plant operator.  
Thereafter, the meaning of the concept of dynamic human reliability analysis (HRA) is 
presented as it is expressed in scientific literature. The concept is not always defined but 
apparently, the dynamic nature is seen either in the phenomena dynamic HRA focuses on or 
defined as the methods used in human reliability assessment. Furthermore, dynamic HRA 
tends to scrutinise human error as closely related to the contextual aspects, opposed to the 
presently central but also older, static approach, according to which human is prone to make 
errors as such. Various methods presently available for dynamic HRA are presented. The 
largest group of methods concentrate on the simulation and modelling of human cognitive 
processes. No comprehensive methodology for dynamic HRA is created but instead, each 
method tends to focus on some aspect or aspects considered relevant from the dynamic 
perspective. Due to the context of the present HRA study, the hybrid control room is also 
scrutinised from the perspective of dynamic HRA. The nature of control room does not seem 
to raise needs or requirements for a specifically dynamic approach. 
Finally, conclusions are provided. Authors present their conception of dynamic HRA, discuss 
the need for the usage of dynamic HRA and contemplate the possibilities for the usage of 
dynamic HRA in the future. 
In the Appendix, a research plan for dynamic HRA research in NAPRA project in 2020 is 
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This report is the deliverable of the task ‘Human reliability analysis’ (T3.2) of the project of 
‘New Development and applications of PRA’ (NAPRA) on 2019.  
 
The goal of NAPRA T3.2 is to define realistic or slightly conservative human error probability 
estimates and to identify the most relevant human failure events in hybrid control rooms. This 
realism includes dynamic HRA, contrasting the traditional static starting point of HRA. 
 
This report presents a literature review of HRA, shedding light on what dynamic HRA means 
in current scientific literature.  
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Conventional human reliability analysis (HRA) relies mostly on static notions. Time, if 
considered at all, is present in time-probability curves that represent the probability that a 
human actor accomplishes a given activity (e.g. detecting failure) within a given time interval. 
Things like the history of events, the state of mind that a person goes through, and how all of 
this (context) affects the performance of the individual and the team are indirectly 
considered, if at all.  
In the recent decade or two, a new paradigm called ‘dynamic HRA’ has entered the field of 
HRA. The concept of dynamic usually refers to continuous and productive activity or change 
(Merriam-Webster, 2019). Thus, it is rather positive adjective in nature, referring to 
something which does not remain the same in a productive way. ‘Dynamic system’ is a 
system or process in which motion occurs, or includes active forces, as opposed to static 
conditions with no motion (Corrosionpedia, 2019). Again, the change is emphasised in this 
definition as well, although the nature of the definition is more neutral than positive. 
Regarding dynamic HRA, the concept is even vaguer.  
Traditionally, the estimates of human errors are based on static situations, even if the former 
events and situations affect the latter ones also in the context of human cognition and 
performance. Static HRA methods consider human performance at a point in time (R.L. 
Boring, 2007), without explaining how a change in one performance shaping factor (PSF) at 
one point affects PSFs and the events after that point. As PSFs are to capture the impact of 
the operating environment on human performance, this means that static methods are not 
sufficient when PSFs are likely to interact and change due to accident progression and the 
passing of time. Most HRA methods (including static ones) account for dependency (Spurgin, 
2009). However, dependency is typically based on an overall human error probability (HEP) 
and does not systematically model the change of PSFs across events (R.L. Boring, 2007).  
Thus, it is likely that HRA captures human errors and the probabilities of those errors best 
when applying a dynamic approach. The concept of dynamic HRA is, hence, highly relevant 
and represents a modern approach on human errors.  
The objective of this study is to clarify the meaning or the variety of meanings of dynamic 
HRA. The means to reach this objective is to conduct a review on current scientific 
conceptions about dynamic HRA. Such scientific publications are selected, which deal with 
the dynamic matters in HRA. 
This report first clarifies the nature of human error and performance from a dynamic 
perspective (section 2) as well as the dynamic nature of the operating environment of the 
nuclear power plant (NPP) operator (section 3), presenting these entities from a general 
perspective. Thereafter, the meaning of the concept of dynamic HRA is presented as it is 
expressed in scientific literature (section 4). In section 5, the different methods for dynamic 
HRA, described in literature, are presented. The context of the HRA studies in SAFIR2022 
takes place in hybrid control rooms. Accordingly, in section 6, the hybrid control room is 












2. Dynamics and errors in human performance 
Human performance and the related psychological aspects, such as cognitive processes, 
e.g., decision making, and emotions, e.g., the ones related to stress, are complex 
phenomena. In this section, descriptive examples are provided about how dynamic human 
performance and the related errors can be tackled from a theoretical perspective. 
Human performance and the related phenomena can be described as a loop or process. 
Briefly, Neisser (Neisser, 1976) describes the role of perception in the Perceptual Cycle 
Model (Figure 1) in which the individual cognitive map of the world directs perceptual 
exploration of the world; with perception, samples of the present environment are taken 
which, in turn, modify the cognitive map of the individual. Thus, human thought is in close 
connection with the person’s interaction with the world. The developing map of the world 
guides in seeking a specific type of information and can lead to anticipation over certain 
types of information (top-down processing).  The map is also used in the interpretation of that 
information. On the other hand, information acquired from the world builds and modifies the 
cognitive map of the world (bottom-up processing). 
 
Figure 1. The Perceptual Cycle Model (adapted from Neisser (Neisser, 1976)). TD refers to 
top-down processing and BU bottom-up processing. 
 
Regarding human errors, the source of the errors can be, based in Perceptual Cycle model, 
in an erroneous or incomplete cognitive map of the world as a whole, or in the schema of 
environment; in what is available in the environment for perceptual exploration; and in the 
nature of the information provided in the environment. 
Perceptual Cycle model has been used in exploring systemic decision-making processes, in 
the context of retrospective accident analysis (Plant & Stanton, 2012)(Banks, Plant, & 
Stanton, 2018). Specifically, the Schema Theory, incorporated in the Perceptual Cycle 
 
 





framework, was used for identifying causal relationships accounting for human error (Plant & 
Stanton, 2012) or for identifying the underlying cause to be “designer error” instead of a 
user’s (in that case, driver’s) one (Banks et al., 2018).  
Accordingly, situation awareness can be defined as firstly, the perception of the elements in 
within space and time, thereafter, the comprehension of their meaning, and finally, the 
projection of the status of those elements in the near future (Endsley, 1995). Defined like 
this, situation awareness includes both the understanding of present situation and the 
anticipation of the situation in the future. Situation awareness, in turn, may impact decision 
making, which affects person’s ability to carry out the correct action (Endsley, 1995) (Figure 
2).  
 
Figure 2. Model of situation awareness in dynamic decision making (simplified, adopted from 
Endsley  (Endsley, 1995)). 
 
The formation of situation awareness is not straightforward. Individuals vary in their ability to 
extract information; the quantity and quality of information the environment provides varies; 
and also, person-dependant factors may affect the formation of situation awareness. Indeed, 
the model of situation awareness in Figure 2 is a simplification of the original model. The 
core, presented in Figure 2, is affected by both task or system related factors and individual 
factors (Endsley, 1995). Task and system related factors are, according to (Endsley, 1995), 
both outside-world related factors such as system capability, interface design and 
automation, and person-related matters of stress and workload. The factor of complexity, 
considered as a task or system factor by Endsley (Endsley, 1995), can be regarded as an 
objective feature of the outside world and as something, which depends on the individual 
(some object can be complex to somebody and not complex to somebody else). Individual 
factors, according to (Endsley, 1995), are goals, objectives and preconceptions as well as 
information processing related matters (information processing mechanisms, long-term 
memory stores and automaticity) and factors affecting information processing (abilities, 
experience and training). These individual factors are more permanent in nature than the 
task and system related, more contextual ones.  
Scrutinising human errors briefly through this model of situation awareness (Figure 2), the 
error may lie in an ambiguous nature of the matters to perceive, person’s ability to 
comprehend those matters as such and the ability to foresee what these matters mean for 
the future situation. Furthermore, the ability to make appropriate decisions may be weakened 
due to temporary or permanent person, task or system related matter. Finally, error may 
occur even if all the preceding phases were conducted appropriately if there is something, 
which hinders the intended performance of correct actions. 
Thus, even these simplified models shed light on the nature of human performance in the 
real life. Human performance is dynamic in nature. Different matters are perceived, 
 
 





depending on the cognitive map, or mental model, of the situation, and the environment, 
which may present clearly or hide the relevant information, from the perspective of a person 
in that specific situation. Not only the outside situation changes but also the matters 
depending on the person change as perception and the related cognitive processes are both 
person and context dependent. People are affected differently by, say, stress, perceived 
familiarity of the situation, as well as uncertainty and complexity of the situation. Hectic 
situations may support some individuals to excel themselves and exhaust others, and some 
endure long-lasting stressful situation when others are fatigued. Emotions may intervene and 
affect teamwork and individual decision-making and consequently, the operations made. 
Universally accepted definition of human errors does not exist. The most widely recognised 
definition is by Reason (Reason, 1990); according to it, human error is “a generic term to 
encompass all those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities 
fails to achieve its intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to the 
intervention of some chance agency” (p. 9). Human error models can be categorised as 
either person models, concentrating on errors made by an individual operator, or system 
models, focussing on the interaction between wider systemic failures and errors made by 
individual operators (Salmon, Lenné, Stanton, Jenkins, & Walker, 2010).  
The dynamic nature of human performance, depending on human or system characteristics 
or both, makes the identification of the cause of human errors more complex. When no 
stationary reasons or permanent characteristics are assumed, the analysis of human error 









3. Dynamics in the operating environment 
There are many dynamic or change-related factors in the operational context of the NPP 
operator. These contextual or objective factors (opposed to cognitive and subjective factors 
related to human performance) are about changes, which take place in the operating and 
surrounding circumstances as well as in the event or accident progression.  
To start with, the situation in the plant is not self-evidently static. Shutdown, start-up, 
maintenance work, incidents and accidents are dynamic by nature or cause changes in the 
state of the plant. Only the state of full power is not dynamic as such, even if the state of the 
plant slightly changes in accordance with the abrasion of components and parts of the plant 
system.   
Regarding incidents and accidents, the starting point may trigger some other events and the 
situation changes by time. The situation evolves also when it proceeds as expected. Thus, 
new alarms may appear, and others disappear. Additionally, as operators are to control the 
nuclear processes, they intervene the proceeding of events when needed and this is 
especially true if an accident takes place. Each involvement changes the situation and 
operators are to manage the situation and update their situation awareness constantly. The 
possibility of having flawed measurements and erroneous alarms, which originate from false 
measurements or no measurement at all add changes to a situation.  
Also, natural or other, not nuclear-originated disaster may affect the situation, making it more 
unpredictable. Examples of such disasters are earthquake, tsunami, forest fire, war, and 
cyber-attack. Even if they would not take place at the NPP site, they can break connections 
for vehicles to the site and diminish or destroy the possibilities to get more resources to the 
site. They can also isolate the site so that it is not possible to get food, water or electricity to 
the site. These external threats also develop by time, possibly adding uncertainty and risks 
related to safety and security.  
Multi-unit sites have the potential to have incidents and accidents that have interrelations 
between each other (Schroer & Modarres, 2013), adding the complexity and unexpected 
changes to the situation. A simple example of this is the potential lack of personnel if some 
accident takes place at both plants in the same site simultaneously.  
The situation may worsen when some critical point, not necessarily known beforehand, is 
reached. This can take place during an accident but also in a day when apparently nothing 
unexpected has happened before something happens. This can be when, for example, a 
weakness not identified earlier has grown enough to cause some damage, such as when a 
slightly loose screw gradually opens and at some point, it is open enough for a flange to 
come off.  
Finally, the changes in personnel add changes to the situation. Each person has his or her 
own competences and style, affecting, for example, how operations are performed and the 
successfulness of communication. Shift changes affect operations, even if they are neutral 
events by nature. Also the support from the outside of the main control room changes the 
situation; it can be good but also bad, if, for example, the new person has such a powerful 
status that operators kind of forget to think by themselves, trusting this new person in a 
wrong way. A less probable but still possible situation is that one operator falls ill or becomes 










4. The meaning of ‘dynamic HRA’ 
A practical driver of increased interest in dynamic HRA is the need to consider long time 
windows that has emerged in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. 
Conventionally the time windows considered in HRA have been limited to 24 hours, but in 
Fukushima it took two or three days from the initiating event for some events significantly 
affecting accident progression to take place (IAEA, 2015). The first initiating event (IE), the 
Great East Japan Earthquake, occurred on March 11, 2011, at 14:45. The last IE, the second 
tsunami, hit the site at 15:36. It has been estimated that the core of Unit 3 uncovered at 13 
March 04:15, indicating an imminent core damage, almost two days after the first IE.  
Accordingly, Tyrväinen et al. (Tyrväinen et al., 2019) carried out a state-of-the-art review on 
long time windows in PRA and important related topics. Longer time windows bring in the 
need to model and analyse more recovery actions and component repairs, which are usually 
governed by procedures and typically evaluated using HRA methods. In this context, existing 
(static) HRA methods may not be suitable for the following reasons: 
 Static HRA methods usually have a too simplistic view on the variety of the ways a 
component can fail, as well as the needed repair time and factors that affect it. This is 
in accordance with the fact that HRA of field workers other than operators (such as 
maintenance personnel) has not received much attention. Consequently, sufficient 
data might not exist to estimate the parameters of a repair time probability 
distribution, and proper modelling may require a lot of expert work.  
 Static HRA methods usually have not been developed to quantify the human error 
probabilities (HEPs) associated with the transportation, placement, connection, or 
local control of portable equipment. These activities, however, take frequently place in 
NPPs. 
 The typical available times for nuclear power plant level 1 human actions are from 30 
minutes to 1 or 2 hours. The existing HRA methods are developed to cope with this 
situation. In the real world, human actions follow each other in a faster pace. 
The modelling of recovery and repair increases HRA model complexity. Modelling of 
dependencies between recoveries and repairs and other human actions has not received 
much attention, but it could make the analysis more realistic. Another potentially important 
aspect of long-term scenarios is the impact of shift changeover on the reliability of measure. 
Shift changeovers may lead to a loss of information or situational awareness, thus inducing 
additional sources of human error. In a longer time scenario, the plant crisis organisation 
would be in place. The potential impacts of multiple decision makers on the performance 
should be considered realistically. Furthermore, a lot of information is missing related to 
human performance: parameters of an actual repair time probability distribution (although 
average repair times are estimated based on repair conducted during normal power 
production); human error probabilities associated with various matters (see the list above); 
the intervening factors in long scenarios such as fatigue; and a wider view of human 
performance, exceeding the one of operators in the main control room. Thus, in the case of 
long time windows, some issues are related to the dynamic features in the situation not 
included in HRA currently, and others related to other type of missing information. 
Dynamic HRA can be scrutinised as compared with static HRA. In static HRA (and PRA), 
events are analysed for an assumed, e.g., typical, window of time. The probability or nature 
of HFE for static HRA does not change as a function of time or the event progression. Either 
the analysis represents a very generic context in which the event would occur, or the 
analysis is agnostic to time, meaning that time evolution is simply not factored into the 
calculation of the human error probability (HEP). Other performance shaping factors (PSFs) 
apart from time drive the quantification of the HEP (Boring 2017). Boring (R.L. Boring, 2007), 
among others, explains the conceptual shift from static HRA to dynamic HRA. Key aspects of 
this shift are the transition from predictions based on fixed models of accident sequences into 
 
 





predictions based on direct simulation of an accident sequence, with explicit consideration of 
timing of key events. 
Dynamic HRA has also been referred to in the context of the dynamic nature of human 
performance (R.L. Boring, 2007). Specifically, the dynamic progression of human behaviour 
is of interest in HRA when it leads up to and follows human failure events (HFEs) (R.L. 
Boring, 2007). 
Time-dependent nature of events is also regarded as part of dynamic HRA as human 
performance may alter depending on time and the changing situation. The changes in 
situation can be based on the appearance of new events and phenomena (objective 
changes) as well as changes in the personal evaluation of the situation, changes in the 
experienced stress etc. (subjective changes). 
Thus, the concept of dynamism can also refer to the dynamic nature of the situation in which 
human error is possible. However, regarding HRA in a dynamic context, the concept of 
‘dynamic HRA’ is not necessarily used. Instead, dynamic PRA environment has been used 
(Mosleh & Chang, 2004). Additionally, causality between cognitive factors and operator 
behaviour can be regarded as part of this concept (Mosleh & Chang, 2004). This causes 
confusion in the concepts of dynamic and static HRA. 
This twofold view on dynamism in the concept of dynamic HRA is parallel to the division of 
models of human error. The focus can be on the nature of human or the one of the 
situations. In both cases, variation in the probability of human error is central but the main or 
only source is regarded to be in the human or the context in which the human is. 
Dynamic HRA has also been defined through the methodology that is suggested to be used 
in HRA. From that perspective, it has been stated (R. L. Boring & Rasmussen, 2017) that for 
greater accuracy in overall risk modelling, virtual operator models should be integrated with 
virtual plant models; that human cognition and action should be dynamically modelled; and 
that these elements should be incorporated into PRA framework. These elements were 









5. The methods of dynamic HRA 
5.1 Background 
Currently, the dichotomy of first-generation and second-generation HRA is assumed. First-
generation HRA (Spurgin, 2010) assume correspondence in the performance of human and 
a machine and, accordingly, in the errors of them. In this approach, human performance is 
considered to consist of tasks; each task can be divided into task units and the status of each 
task unit can be described in terms of success or failure. Thus, in first-generation methods, 
the internal states and cognitive processes of the human are disregarded. Furthermore, 
these methods are not applicable to such situations in which human decision-making guides 
the proceeding of performance as the mental processes are considered as black box if 
anything and, furthermore, usage of first-generation methods requires that human 
performance, i.e., the tasks, is predefined. 
Second-generation HRA evolved later, emphasising the cognitive and other mental 
processes affecting human performance and the related errors. The classification of human 
performance according to the three levels, the ones of skill, rule, and knowledge 
(Rasmussen, 1983) is an example of this approach. The proceeding of cognitive processes 
is the same among individuals so the reliability of human performance is not considered to 
depend primarily on cognitive processes but on the context, which may be of the kind where 
errors are more or less probable. 
In such a categorisation, the first-generation methods are claimed to be, e.g., limited in 
addressing the most risk-significant errors and in finding causal relationships in the error and 
its reasons (Mosleh & Chang, 2004). The more advanced second-generation methods 
appear as suitable for scrutinising human error related performance in a demanding, 
dynamic context. The shift from static to dynamic HRA has been stated to take place along 
with the transition from predictions based on fixed models of accident sequences into 
predictions based on direct simulation of an accident sequence, with explicit consideration of 
timing of key events (R. L. Boring & Rasmussen, 2017). In static HRA, HFE does not change 
as a function of time or during the progression of the event; as a whole, evolution is not 
included in the calculation of HEP (R. L. Boring & Rasmussen, 2017). 
Presently, widely used HRA methods are static. They do not provide a dynamic account of 
human actions or how the PSFs can dynamically modify the HEP over time (Boring, Joe, & 
Mandelli, 2015). Given this simplified approach, once the HEP is calculated based on PSFs 
that modify the nominal HEP, it remains unchanged over the available time. Contrasting to 
this, dynamic HRA does not rely on a fixed set of events and fault trees to model event 
outcome. Rather, it builds the event progression dynamically, as a result of ongoing actions 
(Boring & Rasmussen, 2017). In the following, the HRA methods with a dynamic approach 
are presented. It is not self-evident what techniques are suitable for assessing dynamic HRA. 
Several scientists, according to Boring (R.L. Boring, 2007), have expressed, firstly, the need 
for dynamic HRA and, secondly, have begun developing new HRA methods, or have 
modified existing ones, to account for the dynamic progression of human behaviour, leading 
to and following human failure events. 
It has been suggested (R.L. Boring, 2007) that specifically cognitive modelling and simulation 
address the dynamic nature of human performance and the accompanying human errors. 
When the prediction based, fixed models of accident sequences are substituted by 
simulation of an accident sequence, timing of key events must be explicitly considered and 
the multitude of possible human actions relevant to an event must be simulated as well (R.L. 
Boring, 2007). Thus, as most plant actions are currently controlled by operators, the means 
to have a non-idealised model of plant performance is to account for operator’s controlling 
actions; a high-fidelity (i.e., real) representation of a nuclear power plant requires an accurate 
 
 





model of its human operators (R. L. Boring & Rasmussen, 2017). Accordingly, fusion of 
simulation and modelling with HRA has been suggested (e.g., (Mosleh & Chang, 2004).  
However, the way simulation and modelling should be used is an open question. It is clear 
that there is considerable variation in operators’ performance, in spite of procedures guiding 
this performance (Forester et al., 2012)(Forester et al., 2012)(Forester et al., 2012)(Forester 
et al., 2012)(Forester et al., 2012). Thus, describing operator actions by describing the 
activities based on procedures is not enough. Should the modelling, for example, follow the 
performance of the operators and produce a model about that; or should some predefined 
model of human cognition be taken as granted and then assume the cognitive functioning 
and the related error proneness in some specific situations based on theory; or should 
interviewing or some other method be used instead. An example of one of the possibilities 
listed above is presented by Cacciabue et al. (Cacciabue, Cojazzi, & Parisi, 1996) who 
suggested the usage of error probability assessment based on cognitive simulation and the 
related taxonomies of erroneous behaviour. 
According to (R. L. Boring & Rasmussen, 2017), dynamic HRA is essentially about following 
the evolution of the event and in that case, the modelling in the subtask level is important. 
They state that computational techniques, namely simulation and modelling, are needed to 
integrate virtual operator models with virtual plant models, and dynamic modelling of human 
cognition and actions is the other key element in dynamic HRA. Thus, the modelling should 
be performed regarding the operator cognition (invisible activities, on which behaviour is 
based), operator behaviour (visible activities) and plant behaviour.  
 
5.2 Early approaches 
As early as 1993, dynamic event tree was presented in scientific literature (Acosta & Siu, 
1993). It provided a framework for treating stochastic variation both in operating crew states 
and in hardware states. With an example analysis of a steam generator tube rupture, authors 
showed how important operator behaviour patterns could be represented with the method 
and how sources of dependencies between failures were better defined with it. 
Another early contribution on dynamic HRA was made in 1999. Many HRA methods that 
time, in 90’s, give a rather static description of man–machine system performance, and 
consider human contribution to risk in a too straightforward way. Holmberg et al. (Holmberg, 
Hukki, Norros, Pulkkinen, & Pyy, 1999) developed an approach to analyse operators’ 
decision making and to perform human reliability analysis (HRA) for accident sequences. In 
the approach of Holmberg and colleagues (Holmberg et al., 1999), description of the activity 
context, probabilistic modelling, and psychological analysis form an iterative interdisciplinary 
sequence of analysis in which the results of one subtask may be input to another. Decision 
analytic dynamic reliability model (Holmberg et al., 1999) integrates probabilistic and 
psychological approaches in human reliability. The aim is to provide a conceptual interface 
between these approaches and to design such an analysis process that supports the 
formation of the integrated view, not to design an actual HRA method. The analysis of the 
context is carried out first with the help of a common set of conceptual tools. The resulting 
descriptions of the context promote the probabilistic modelling, through which new results 
regarding the probabilistic dynamics can be achieved. The more comprehensive description 
of the human activity context takes better into account the dynamic nature of the man–
machine interaction by creating a conceptual interface between the probabilistic reliability 
analysis and contextual psychology.  
The analysis process proceeds in two levels or phases, in the description of the context, and 
in psychological and probabilistic modelling. In probabilistic analysis, data is collected and 
applied in a statistical manner to validate the model structure and to estimate the probability 
parameters. In psychological analysis, data is used in a descriptive manner for the analysis 
of the operators’ actual performance and its effect on risk. Operators’ activities are observed 
 
 





so that critical diagnostic process information and the relevant decision alternatives are 
formulated beforehand, to support observation. Also, expert judgements are used, and 
operators can be interviewed. In the process, operator decision making is of central 
importance, concluded from the analyses described above. Decisions influence risks and the 
probabilistic analysis handles actions as components of the risk assessment of the studied 
sequence. The challenges they are trying to meet are the following (Holmberg et al., 1999):  
 Operators controlling hazardous processes work in a dynamic environment, requiring 
interpretation of the situation and decision making.  
 The operators’ ability to manage the situations depends on the state of the process 
and on the available resources to regulate. 
 The reliability of the operators in process control is sensitive to the context e.g. 
process information, procedures, co-operational resources (the number and 
competence of operators) and division of labour. 
 The contextual nature of human activities has conventionally been reduced to the 
assessment of situation specific performance shaping factors in risk analysis. 
Interaction between operators and the context of their activity have not been explicitly 
included in the models in a deeper sense. 
The benefits of the framework are based on conscious, conceptually shared communication 
between approaches during the analysis process. Even if the approach was not labelled as 
focusing on the dynamic aspect of human performance, the dynamic dimension is 
interwoven in it. 
5.3 Cognitive simulation  
Simulation is generally used in the analysis of plant response for PRA, and its purpose is to 
mimic the behaviour of the plant in the given scenario. Therefore, it is natural to consider 
mimicking the behaviour of humans in a given scenario. The purpose of cognitive simulation 
is just that, or more precisely, mimicking human decision making.  
In the context of dynamic HRA, cognitive simulation means the simulation of a cognitive 
model with respect to time. A cognitive model, in its turn, represents human cognitive 
processing, which can be defined, with the aim of having a relevant definition for HRA 
purposes, as including perception, diagnosis and decision-making. Also action can be 
included as the final phase of cognitive processes, even if strictly taken, action is not 
cognitive but behavioural. A cognitive model is based on a cognitive architecture, the 
structural properties of the modelled system or, as defined by the Institute of Creative 
Technologies of the University of Michigan, “hypothesis about the fixed structures that 
provide a mind, whether in natural or artificial systems, and how they work together - in 
conjunction with knowledge and skills embodied within the architecture - to yield intelligent 
behaviour in a diversity of complex environments”. In artificial intelligence, cognitive 
architecture may refer both to such a theory about the structure of the human mind, and to a 
computer implementation of such a theory.  
In the human factors literature, cognitive modelling is often referred to as human 
performance modelling. It has been widely applied especially in the aviation sector, see for 
example (Pew, 2008) or (Zhang & Xue, 2013). Several useful contributions have been 
developed in human performance modelling, for example GOMS (Goals, Operators, 
Methods, and Selection rules) (Card, Moran, & Newell, 1983). GOMS is a ystematic 
description of how to calculate the time to accomplish tasks, based on the time that is spent 
in physical and mental actions required of the task. 
 
 





5.3.1 Modelling paradigms and platforms 
There are several modelling paradigms that can be utilized in cognitive modelling: 
 symbolic cognitive architectures rely on explicit conceptual models of the domain and 
their manipulation on the symbol level. They can be implemented by rule-based 
systems, belonging to logical programming, 
 sub symbolic approaches are based on numerical models as a formalism for 
representation and analysis. The most important sub symbolic approach to cognitive 
modelling, neural networks (Levine, 2019), provide a way of constructing models that 
have analogies to the functioning of the brain at the neural level. However, they 
require data for learning the model parameters, it is not easy to get an explanation to 
why a given decision was made, and it is trivial to model human errors in this 
paradigm. Therefore, they are not among the most promising approaches to cognitive 
modelling for HRA. Another sub symbolic approach that seems to be gaining more 
popularity is Bayesian cognitive modelling (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013), 
 hybrid architectures combine symbolic and sub symbolic approaches, 
 other paradigms that have been utilized include discrete event simulation (Lockett, 
1997) and network models (Siegel & Wolf, 1969). 
A popular means of organizing a cognitive architecture is intelligent agents (Resconi & Jain, 
2004). Wikipedia defines an intelligent agent as “an autonomous entity which acts, directing 
its activity towards achieving goals (i.e. it is an agent), upon an environment using 
observation through sensors and consequent actuators (i.e., it is “intelligent”)”. Thus, an 
intelligent agent may be seen as a rough analogue to a human individual.  
Various tools and platforms can be utilised in the implementation of cognitive simulation. 
Some have a very wide scope of application outside cognitive simulation, others have been 
constructed from the beginning to this purpose. 
Saint is a general purpose discrete-event simulation language (implemented in the computer 
program Micro Saint, currently available as Micro Saint Sharp, developed by Ailon Science 
and Technology) that has been used widely to model task performance in military and other 
applications, see, e.g., Lockett (Lockett, 1997). It is likely that other major discrete-event 
simulation platforms such as Arena, Simul8 and SimPy are also suitable for cognitive 
simulation purposes. 
Soar (State, Operator, And Result) (Laird, 2012) is a major general-purpose cognitive 
architecture that relies largely on symbolic constructs. It aims to provide means for complete 
simulation of an intelligent agent. Procedural knowledge is represented by rules, and 
semantic knowledge by relational graph structures. Its output is a complete simulation from 
which various measures of performance can be derived. It is available open-source and free. 
ACT-R (Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational) is a general-purpose cognitive architecture. It 
is “perhaps the most widely used cognitive architecture” (Pew, 2008). According to 
Wikipedia, it “aims to define the basic and irreducible cognitive and perceptual operations 
that enable the human mind”. It has been inspired by the progress of cognitive neuroscience. 
The computer implementation of ACT-R is written in the Common Lisp programming 
language, and is available open-source and free. 
Other notable platforms include MIDAS (Man-machine Integration Design and Analysis 
System) (Gore & Jarvis, 2005), developed by NASA Ames Research Laboratory, and D-
OMAR (Distributed Operator Model Architecture) developed by Bolt Beranek and Newman. 
 
 





5.3.2 Cognitive simulators for HRA 
Cognitive simulators have been proposed or applied also in HRA (see also the list of 
cognitive simulators in the article of Trucco and Leva (Trucco & Leva, 2007)). 
A framework for using MIDAS for HRA has been proposed (Ronald L. Boring, Dudenhoeffer, 
Hallbert, & Gore, 2006) but not implemented. 
Human Error Modeling Architecture (HEMA) (Fotta, Byrne, & Luther, 2005) has been 
designed on the basis of ACT-R. Based on a set of general error mechanisms that have 
been specified, it has been identified where ACT-R can be used, where it has to be modified, 
and where new mechanisms or models would be needed. The system is in conceptual 
design phase. 
The Accident Dynamics Simulator-Information Decision and Action in Crew (ADS-IDAC) 
system (Chang & Mosleh, 2007a) was developed for HRA applications. Its scope is to 
“probabilistically predict the responses of the nuclear power plant control room-operating 
crew during an accident for use in probabilistic risk assessments”. Operator response include 
cognitive, emotional and physical activities. It is presented with more detail in section 5.4. 
PRObabilistic COgnitive Simulator for HRA studies (PROCOS) is based on a “semi-static” 
approach to combine first-generation HRA methods with cognitive modelling. The dynamism 
comes from cognitive simulation, which, in turn, is based on a cognitive flow chart. Two flow 
charts are introduced, one for operator behaviour in normal operations, and one for recovery 
phase. The inputs to the simulation come largely from ordinary HRA analysis: PSFs, 
hardware involved and its possible states, steps of the task (from task analysis), and a set of 
error modes. 
A Simulator for Human ERror Probability Analysis (SHERPA) (Di Pasquale, Miranda, 
Iannone, & Riemma, 2015) combines, like PROCOS, cognitive simulation with HRA 
methods. Error probability is estimated as a function of the task, PSFs, and the time spent on 
the task. SHERPA has been later enhanced into a HRA model called Emergency Human 
Error Analysis (EHEA) that aims to “evaluate human error probability in emergency 
conditions in industrial plants and critical infrastructures” (Petrillo, Falcone, De Felice, & 
Zomparelli, 2017). 
Cognitive simulation (perhaps combined with plant simulation) may be used in the following 
ways to capture and generate data for HRA purposes (R.L. Boring, 2007; Di Pasquale et al., 
2015): 
 simulation runs produce logs that can be used in expert judgment to produce human 
error probabilities. 
 simulation can be used to produce estimates of PSFs. 
 simulation can be used to produce task performance times and other performance 
measures. These can be combined with performance criteria set for the task (e.g. 
maximum time allowed) to produce frequentist estimates of human failure probability. 
There are several cases showing where cognitive simulation would be a major benefit for 
HRA. Firstly, it is needed, when the “safety of novel equipment and configurations” (R.L. 
Boring, 2007) needs to be assessed. This is when main control room simulator, operators, or 
indeed even a plant, are not available. Thus, cognitive simulation allows HRA analyses in the 
design phase of a new NPP.  
Secondly, cognitive simulation allows also estimates of human error probabilities for human 
actions for which simulators or data are not available or applicable, such as repair or 
maintenance actions.  
 
 





Finally, cognitive simulators can also be used in scenarios for which simulator data is not 
available and is not practicable to produce. For example, it is likely that very little data is 
available concerning human actions with long time windows (e.g. 48 hours), because this 
would require the involvement of operators and simulator personnel for a very long time. 
Another example of impracticability of producing real data is when a human error is a priori 
judged to be very rare. To produce enough data for estimating such a low probability would 
require a very large number of simulator experiments (say, tens or hundreds of thousands). 
Then, cognitive simulation provides a means to get at least some data. 
The main problem and constraint of currently existing HRA applications of cognitive 
simulation is that the models are very narrow, concentrating on single scenarios, and that 
they lack generality. Also their construction is tedious. 
5.4 Crew behaviour 
Complex technological systems are usually operated and maintained by teams of humans 
and the team performance is strongly affected by the communication and collaboration 
among operators under a dynamic situation. Since the human cognitive processes heavily 
depend on the context in the real environment, Shu et al. (Shu, Furuta, & Kondo, 2002) 
propose a team behaviour network model that can simulate and analyse response of an 
operator team to an incident in a dynamic and context-sensitive situation. The model is an 
attempt to find the all likely event chains for the given initial event. Considering collaboration 
and communication, which is triggered by individual factors, organization structure and type 
of task, they are aiming to analyse team cognitive process after an initiating event has 
occurred and predict team performance under possible event sequence. Comparison of the 
results between simulation and an experiment of FAB (feed and bleed) operation in PWR 
(pressurized water reactor) shows that the operators’ actual performance can be simulated 
approximately. Details of the simulation result, however, differ from the experiment because 
of some idealistic assumptions in the team model. The model was built based on expert 
judgement. 
ADS-IDAC (Chang & Mosleh, 2007b) is a method to probabilistically predict the responses of 
the control-room crew during an accident. The response includes cognitive, emotional, and 
physical activities. ADS refers to Accident Dynamics Simulator, which is a dynamic PRA 
computer simulation program, developed in part to implement the IDAC model. IDAC, in turn, 
refers to the model of Information Decision and Action in Crew. IDAC model suits best for 
computer simulation - accordingly, ADS has been used to test IDAC and the feasibility of 
integrated dynamic PRA for NPP risk applications. The evolution of IDAC and ADS has 
provided a framework to integrate many of the findings and developments from various 
related disciplines into a common predictive HRA model, with a reasonable chance for 
meeting key scientific validity criteria. Once fully developed, in addition to its use as a full-
scale dynamic PRA environment, ADS–IDAC can also support classical PRA and HRA 
analyses, and further research and development activities in the area of operator response 
modelling. A key difference between ADS-IDAC and other dynamic PRA methodologies is 
that ADS has the IDAC cognitive model integrated to perform automatic, systematic, and 
probabilistic simulation of human-system interactions. IDAC models the individual and group 
behaviour of the operating crew. Each individual operator model includes elements of the 
IDAC cognitive architecture (e.g., performance-influencing factors (PIFs), memory 
architecture) and model of cognitive process (e.g., information processing model). In 
modelling cognition, IDAC combines the effects of rational and emotional dimensions through 
a small number of generic rules-of-behaviour that govern the dynamic responses of the 
operator. These responses include information pre-processing (I), diagnosis and decision-
making (D), and action execution (A). Mental state is a representation of an operator’s mind. 
The interaction between mental state and the I–D–A activities is a dynamic process of mutual 
influences.   
 
 





The model (Chang & Mosleh, 2007b) has three generic types of operator: decision maker, 
action taker, and consultant. Each of them has: defined tasks and responsibilities, defined 
formal communication channels, defined knowledge and experience bases, and unique 
psychological and physical characteristics. Crew influences on individual operator response 
through the IDAC team-related PIFs. Crew interaction has two main features: communication 
and coordination. Crew interacts with the system through the actions of its individual 
members. The ADS code simulates accident scenarios and generates information about the 
external world (i.e., system state and environmental variables). This information is then used 
as input to the crew model (i.e., IDAC), which in turn simulates various types of operator 
response including actions on the system.  
PHOENIX (Ekanem, Mosleh, & Shen, 2016) is a method for producing HFEs and likely 
scenarios leading to each event. It utilizes “crew response trees” that provide a structure for 
capturing the context of HFEs, for errors of commission and omission. It also brings the 
Information, Decision and Action cognitive model to team level, and uses “macro-cognitive” 
abstractions of crew behaviour, and findings from scientific literature and operating 
experience “to identify potential causes of failures and influencing factors”. 
IDHEAS (J. Xing et al., 2017) models the errors made by trained crews performing required 
responses to plant disturbances. It addresses post-initiator, internal at-power events at 
nuclear power plants. The crews modelled are NPP control room crews. It also utilizes crew 
response trees. The qualitative analysis part includes a cognitive task analysis process 
where analysts “identify and graphically represent crew response paths and critical tasks 
needed for success”. The quantitative part analyses a set of crew failure modes (CFM) and 
their performance influencing factors (PIF). The HEPs of the CFMs under various 
combinations of PIFs are estimated by formal expert judgment. 
Still one way to model crew behaviour is multi-agent modelling. Considerable research 
literature exists on combining agents (see section 5.3.1) - intelligent or otherwise - to multi-
agent systems (Weiss, 1999). It has turned out that multi-agent systems provide a natural 
and useful platform for the simulation of teams and crews (Sycara & Lewis, 2008). 
5.5 Other approaches 
Gertman (Gertman, 2012) focuses on the dynamic environment and calls for sensitivity to 
complexity in advanced digital environments. He has identified three complexity factors and 
proposes a rating scale approach that suits for HRA purposes. The complexity factors are 
based on the model proposed by Xing and Manning (Jing Xing & Manning, 2005), 
approaching complexity from the viewpoints of  
 quantity (number of steps it takes to solve a problem),  
 variety (switching between patterns of information that may be emerging, variety in 
interaction metaphors for system devices in the same control room, and variety in the 
types of tasks being performed) and 
 relations (rules, structures, interconnections). 
GOMS-HRA (R. L. Boring & Rasmussen, 2017) concentrates on categorising subtasks as 
the so-called GOMS primitives. G represents Goals, i.e., the high—level tasks the human 
seeks to complete; O is for Operators, that is, the available actions the human can take; M 
for Methods, the steps or sub goals the human takes towards the goals; and Selection rules 
for S, i.e., the decisions humans make. GOMS has been used for various purposes. This 
solution is developed because dynamic HRA, following the evolution of the event, often 
requires modelling at the subtask level. GOMS-HRA states that the performance shaping 
factor and its’ influence on operator’s performance can change over time; the final effect is 
that the human error probability varies over time. Regarding HRA, GOMS brings the idea that 
 
 





each step of an operator is coded, resulting to a model with such additional information that 
makes HRA possible. Presently, GOMS-HRA provides a useful technique enabling crew 
modelling in dynamic HRA. However, only future research will refine and implement GOMS-
HRA into dynamic HRA. 
Dynamic methods may also be used to provide data for HRA methods. Groth et al. (Groth, 
Smith, & Moradi, 2019) present an algorithm for using causal models and multiple types of 
HRA data for cognitively based HRA methods such as PHOENIX and IDHEAS. It uses 
causal models that utilise data from cognitive literature, systems engineering, existing HRA 
methods, simulator data and expert opinion. These causal factors are combined with team 
tasks and events to formulate Bayesian network models, and finally, Bayesian parameter 









6. Dynamic HRA in hybrid main control room 
According to Jiang et al. (Jiang et al., 2018), the traditional cognitive model cannot be quite 
qualified with the human reliability evaluation of digital human-computer interface, because 
there are differences in the human cognitive behaviour compared with traditional human-
machine interface, for example: 1) operators need to observe and analyse more parameters, 
perform emergency procedures, plan secondary tasks, search navigation information, etc.; 2) 
the parameters and procedures are dynamic changes; 3) the positions to display information 
and procedures on screens are not fixed. Taking a nuclear power plant as research 
background, Jiang et al. propose a cognitive reliability model for digital human-computer 
interface based on Bayesian networks, to be able to consider the multiple states of human, 
randomness, uncertainty and relevance between variables. Thus, it is indirectly stated that 
digital and analogue control rooms call for different approaches. Based on this, it can be 
concluded that HRA for hybrid control rooms is more complex to perform.  
Accordingly, complexity has been stated to be the distinguishing feature among performance 
shaping factors regarding advanced control room design (Gertman, 2012). Diversity in 
instrumentation is stated to heighten complexity (Gertman, 2012); this claim is originally 
about small modular reactors but is true in any control room. Furthermore, diversity is 
emphasised in hybrid control rooms where units to be used by operators are of two different 
nature, that is, the one of analogue and another of the digital type. 
To conclude, there is no expressed demand in scientific literature that hybrid control room (or 
any type of control room) would require a dynamic approach. The assumed complexity may 
result in dynamic changes in the operating environment, though, and may also initiate more 











This report briefly clarifies the nature of human error and performance from a dynamic 
perspective, using two models, one relating to the process of human perception (by Neisser) 
and another to situation awareness (by Endsley), as examples of that. The report also briefly 
describes the dynamic nature of the operating environment of the nuclear power plant 
operator. Thus, the dynamic nature of the target of HRA is taken as a starting point. 
Also the meaning of the concept of dynamic HRA is presented as it is expressed in scientific 
literature. The concept of dynamic HRA is somewhat unclear in scientific discussion. It often 
seems to be referred to as a generally known concept but closer scrutiny shows that 
sometimes the dynamic phenomena to be assessed are seen as defining the essence of 
dynamic HRA, whereas in other cases, the methods with which HRA is conducted are 
conceived as factors defining dynamic HRA. 
Furthermore, dynamic HRA tends to scrutinise human error as closely related to the 
contextual aspects, opposed to the presently central but also older, static approach, 
according to which human is prone to make errors as such. Thus, dynamic HRA represents a 
more modern view on human performance. The view including the contextual factors in 
human erroneous performance is more open to see the human also as an actor capable of 
compensating flaws in the technical environment. Even if HRA as such concentrates on, 
naturally, human errors, the possibility to perceive human also as capable of such safety 
supporting, flexible activities technology can never accomplish is a perspective and 
possibility to add safety in the nuclear domain. 
The various methods presently available for dynamic HRA are presented in the review. The 
largest group of methods concentrate on the simulation and modelling of human cognitive 
processes. No comprehensive methodology for dynamic HRA is created but instead, each 
method tends to focus on some aspect or aspects considered relevant from the dynamic 
perspective. 
Due to the context of the present HRA study, that is, HRA in hybrid control rooms, the hybrid 
control room is also scrutinised from the perspective of dynamic HRA. The nature of control 
room does not seem to raise needs or requirements for a specifically dynamic approach. 
According to the conception of the authors of this review, humans, the nuclear power plant, 
and the objectives for human work form the entity, which should be included in HRA. The 
concept - or perhaps even the paradigm - of ‘dynamic HRA’ emphasises the context of 
human perceptions, decisions and actions, and time as an essential aspect of the context. 
The concept has been necessitated by empirical evidence that reveals how complex the 
reasons of human error often are and enabled by advances in cognitive psychology on the 
one hand, and computer-based modelling and simulation on the other. Parallel to this, the 
operating context, i.e., the NPP, in which the human operator acts, is not static either. 
Gradual degradation and latent flaws call for rapid corrective actions and in the case of an 
incident or accident, the situation is continuously changing and humans are to constantly 
update their situation awareness and perform accordingly. Thus, the qualities of the target of 
assessment cannot be separated from the methods with which these phenomena are to be 
assessed. 
Long-lasting events and, especially, event sequences increase the demand for a dynamic 
approach. Not all situations are long-lasting and still, it can be stated that dynamic approach 
is needed. Reality is dynamic, be it either inside the human (i.e., mental states and cognitive 
processes) or outside of it (such as group dynamics as expressed in crew collaboration and 
the changing state of a nuclear power plant). As a consequence, dynamics in HRA, from the 
 
 





perspectives of the target of assessment and the assessment method, makes HRA more 
realistic and hence, in principle, provides more possibilities for HRA to be more accurate and, 
consequently, more reliable.  
Dynamic phenomena are more demanding to take into account than assuming a static 
approach. This is probably the reason for having static HRA as the mainstream approach. 
With static methods, results are obtained with a reasonable time and effort. However, 
methods develop by time and it is both probable and desirable that dynamic approach will 
gradually gain momentum. It is also possible that some specific event will cast the possibility 
and need of dynamic approach to general knowledge. Unfortunately, these events may also 
negative ones, like Fukushima accident raised the topic of multi-unit accidents to the 
discussions in the nuclear domain.   
The strengths, weaknesses and targets for applications of dynamic HRA represent part of 
HRA. One way the nuclear domain may proceed to a more dynamic approach is to apply 
dynamic HRA to the most dynamic and critical part of the human related phenomena in the 
nuclear domain while using the static HRA in the remaining areas. The presently ongoing 
updating of control rooms, resulting first in hybrid and finally in digital control rooms, does not 
seem to increase the demand of dynamic approach, at least as reflected in the scientific 
literature. The development of the nuclear domain may add pressure to a more dynamic 
approach based on other phenomena, though. It is possible that in the future, nuclear 
authorities start to require more dynamic HRA methods because the usage and risks related 
to nuclear power plants seem to become more dynamic in the future. This is true related to 
small modular reactors, which are expected to organise production in a flexible way, making 
load-following a highly dynamic process on a daily basis. 
The next step in this study will be a survey on how HRA (PRA) professionals in Finland 
understand the dynamic HRA and what their potential practices and needs related to that 
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Appendix: Research plan on dynamic HRA in NAPRA project, 2020 
Survey on dynamic HRA 
 
This survey is targeted to HRA experts (or PRA experts with some experience in HRA) of the 
Finnish stakeholders (STUK, Fennovoima, Fortum, TVO). The objective of the survey is to 
clarify the present conception, needs and analysis practices related to dynamic HRA among 
nuclear safety professionals in Finland. The outcome will be a summary of survey results. 
The following themes will be addressed in the survey. 
Theme A: Present conception of dynamic HRA (what dynamic HRA means, how familiar the 
respondents are with the concept). 
Theme B: Present methods to handle dynamics in human actions utilized in the field (are 
dynamic phenomena handled in HRA, how they are handled or why they are not handled). 
Theme C: Needs for dynamic approaches in HRA (do the respondents see needs or value in 
dynamic approaches regarding human action and error, in what context dynamic approaches 
are needed, what kind of support could future research on dynamic HRA provide for 
respondents, e.g. the content of the empirical study (see below)). 
Empirical study 
 
Based on the results of the survey, the method of the empirical study will be decided. The 
objective of the empirical study is to identify the conceptions, impressions and experiences 
related to dynamic phenomena in pre-accident and accident situations. In each option, the 
outcome will be a summary and qualitative analysis of the study results. The following 
tentative options are provided. 
 
Option 1: Interviews.  
Interviewing may be used as the research method. Interviewees will be main control room 
operators. 
Dynamic phenomena consist of contextual factors inducing dynamicity in the situation, and 
cognitive factors related to dynamicity in the human mind. 
Interviews deal with phenomena, situations and conceptions that the operators associate 
with dynamicity. Some of the questions will be forced-choice questions, and other questions 
are open. 
Option 2: Analysis of recorded simulator tests 
VTT has recorded operator performance in simulator tests as part of human factors studies. 
These recordings may be used for analysing dynamic features in operator performance. 
First a set of criteria for recognizing dynamic phenomena in operator performance will be 
specified, and a note-taking practice will be defined. During the viewing, the defined 
methodology will be applied. 
Option 3: Analysis of simulator tests 
A set of simulator runs will be specified and conducted. In the runs and the analysis of the 
results, dynamic phenomena will be emphasized. 
First a set of criteria for recognizing dynamic phenomena in operator performance will be 
specified, and a note-taking practice will be defined. During the viewing, the defined 
methodology will be applied. 
